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Abstract
A distinguishing feature among households is whether adult members work or not, since
the employment status aﬀects a household’s available time for home activities. Using a
survey method in two countries, Belgium and Germany, we provide household incomes that
retain the level of well-being across diﬀerent family types, distinguished by family size and
employment status of adults. Our tests support that specialization in home production and
childcare-time costs are important determinants of household well-being. Estimates of child
costs relative to an adult are higher for households that are time-constrained (all adults in
the household work), and also higher for poorer households.
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11. Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Becker (1965) on the economics of household production,
time spent for producing “commodities at home” has received remarkable attention. Many
studies suggest treatments of the time input in household production functions in order
to address questions about labor supply, marriage decisions, inequality, social security or
population aging.
Applied studies using econometric or calibration approaches to issues that involve home
production rely upon information from consumer-expenditure, labor-supply, or time-use sur-
veys. However, numerous unobservable factors driving home production choices make it
diﬃcult to elicit unambiguous conclusions about preference and home-production primitives
from the currently available databases through simple consumer-behavior and rationality
principles. So, applied scholars are obliged to make explicit assumptions, for example, on
the behavior of household members, or on the structure of utility and production functions.
Both the qualitative and, especially, the quantitative properties of the ex-post orderings
of household well-being due to household choices in applied models, are often sensitive to
prior assumptions. Especially for multi-person families, there is no consensus on which as-
sumptions to use. In this case, additional assumptions are needed for an intra-household
allocation mechanism.1
Developing ways to obtain direct empirical estimates of household incomes that preserve
the level of well-being across diﬀerent family types, distinguished by family size and em-
ployment status of adults, can provide key information for evaluating the appropriateness of
candidate assumptions in applied research of home economics, since the employment status
1 For example, approaches vary from Becker’s model of cooperative family collective choice to bargaining
models with individual utility maximizers within the household. See Pollak (2002) for further details and
guidance to the literature.
2aﬀects a household’s available time for home activities. We provide such estimates through
a survey approach, and test implications of core assumptions behind the mechanics of home
production and intra-household allocations of time and other goods.
In our survey we ask questions as: “which family-income level can make a household with
one employed and one unemployed adult with two children achieve the same well-being as a
household with an unemployed single childless adult and a monthly family income of $1,000,
according to your opinion? What income do you suggest if in the previous question both
adults were unemployed? And what if both adults were employed?” The answers to these
questions are direct assessments of “equivalent incomes:” incomes that make the well-being
of households with diﬀerent demographic composition and employment patterns equal. The
information contained in equivalent incomes enables us to study the role of diﬀerent time
constraints for household production or leisure activities for welfare comparisons.2
The pattern of such a proﬁle of equivalent incomes may also depend on the underlying
level of well-being. In our survey, we identify and ﬁx three diﬀerent levels of well-being, by
providing each of our subjects with three speciﬁc income levels, “reference incomes,” for an
unemployed single childless adult (our “reference household type”).
Using this survey method, we collect data from Belgium and Germany. Our database is
essentially non-parametric, with the sole exception that we pre-specify a set of hypothetical
household types and reference incomes that are related to the bottom-, middle-, and upper
quintile of the personal-income distribution of single adults in these two countries. For
this reason, the equivalent incomes that we obtain can provide information about inter-
household orderings of well-being stemming from actual consumer-expenditure and time-
allocation choices by households, at least in the way these are perceived by our respondents.
2 A similar type of survey was also used by Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005), to study the
sharing potential of multi-person households at diﬀerent levels of well-being.
3Thus, the implications of a wide range of consumer-behavior models can be re-examined
after adding the information we provide.
If individuals simply value leisure and consume only ﬁnal market goods, the stated equiv-
alent incomes for family types with more employed members should be higher. This could
be a plain compensation in terms of ﬁnal goods for the loss of leisure time or for the disu-
tility of eﬀort. If, in addition, time is an input to household production, then more time
spent in the market has more complex implications for well-being. Individuals might need to
“outsource,” i.e. to buy ﬁnal goods as substitutes for goods that they could have produced
at home, or they might need to reduce leisure.
The decision whether to buy a ﬁnal good in the market or to produce a substitute good
at home, depends on several unobservable factors. Apart from the preferences over the ﬁnal
good itself, important are also the preferences over the type of activity, the preferences over
the eﬀort involved, the eﬃciency of the household production activity and eﬀort, that may
also depend on the existing stock of durable household equipment, the possibility to produce
some diﬀerent goods at the same time (joint production), among others.
For example, the only observables behind the decision of a single childless adult to cook
or to dine in a restaurant are the prices of meals at restaurants, the prices of food ingre-
dients and cooking equipment, the personal income and maybe some other socioeconomic
variables (such as gender, age, occupational status or education). Simple arguments of
revealed preference based on this limited set of observables, without strong assumptions
on several important unobservable primitives of home production, such as the nature of a
home-production function, are unable to explain the choices.
The involvement of non-market time constraints into household well-being is further
diﬃcult to evaluate in multi-person households. Apart from the fact that there is sharing
4potential for ﬁnal consumption goods (joint consumption), there is also a sharing potential
for the consumption of home-production activities. For example, two adults might enjoy
cooking together more. More importantly, the time input in home production can be an
input to two activities, for example one can cook and take care of children at the same time
(joint production). Or, it might take about the same time to cook for four people as it would
take to cook for two (economies of scale).
Since Becker’s (1965) work, the literature is full of such examples, and also very rich
in proposed household allocation mechanisms and models. An important breakthrough has
been made since the introduction and utilization of time-use survey data. Time-use surveys
provide information about the chosen allocation of time, which is a signiﬁcant extension to
the information set available to researchers of home economics. In recent work by Gronau
and Hamermesh (2001) and (2003), some cross-country empirical regularities about time
allocations are striking. First, childcare is an important part of the time budget and this
activity is rather time-intensive. Second, more educated (and richer) households work less
at home and their home production activities are more goods-intensive than these of the less
educated (poorer).
Such empirical facts have motivated scholars to follow speciﬁc modeling directions and
to rethink their assumptions about the intra-household time allocation mechanisms. In
particular, Apps and Rees (2002) have used a model where adults engage into a type of
within-household Ricardian trade and specialization according to comparative advantage in
order to re-evaluate the costs of children when childcare is included. They utilize informa-
tion from both time-use survey data and consumer expenditures. Our ﬁndings support the
direction of some of their assumptions on the intra-household time allocation mechanism.
Tests using our data support that, (i) specialization in home/market activities is a plausi-
5ble time allocation mechanism in two-adult households, (ii) childcare inﬂuences signiﬁcantly
the overall household level of well-being, and (iii) richer households have an advantage in
dealing with decreases in their non-market time endowment. Consistently with these three
observations, our estimates of child costs relative to an adult are higher for households that
are time-constrained (all adults in the household work), and also higher for poorer house-
holds. Our results can also serve as a step for improving both econometric approaches as this
of Apps and Rees (2002) and for calibration approaches to models studying the economics of
diﬀerent family types, as these of Aiyagari, Greenwood and Güner (2000) and Greenwood,
Güner and Knowles (2000) on marriage decisions, and Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu
(2005) on female labor supply.
In Section 2 we explain our method and samples. In Section 3 we provide the averages of
equivalent incomes and we discuss their direct implications. In Section 4 we analyze speciﬁc
hypotheses and empirical facts from time survey data in the literature about home production
and intra-household time allocations and examine whether our results are consistent with
these hypotheses. In Section 5 we provide our estimates for children costs relative to an
adult and we compare them with these of Apps and Rees (2002). In Section 6 we suggest
extensions and we conclude with Section 7.
2. Survey structure and samples
Our survey consists of three sections, all appearing in the appendix. In the ﬁrst section we
give information to the respondents about the topic in question and we explain the task
they must perform. In the second section we ask our respondents to state some of their
personal characteristics that could possibly inﬂuence their judgements about the role of the
household time allocations for well-being.
6The third section contains the core questions of our survey. We provide our subjects with
a table of 20 entries, each corresponding to a family type distinguished according to three
dimensions, namely, (i) the number of adults, (ii) the number of children in the household,
and, (iii) the employment status of adults. Moving downwards within each column of the
table, we increase the number of children (from zero to three children). Moving within
rows from left to right, we increase the number of adults, from one to two adults, and we
also vary the employment status of these adults between unemployed and full-time employed.
Denoting an unemployed adult by “U” and an employed adult by “E,” the sequence from left
to right is, U, E, UU, EU, EE. Each child is denoted by “C,” so, EUCCC is a household with
two adults, one employed and one unemployed, and three children. We tell our respondents
to consider that adults are individuals of age 35 to 55, and that children are of age 7 to 11.
In the ﬁrst entry of the table we provide the after-tax monthly income of a reference
household, an unemployed single childless adult. All the remaining 19 entries are empty,
and our subjects are asked to ﬁll them in with after-tax monthly family incomes that bring
all households to the same level of well-being as this of the reference household. We provide
our subjects with two more tables of the same structure, with the sole diﬀerence that the
reference income of the reference household is diﬀerent. The three levels are deﬁned as
follows: the lowest reference income is the absolute poverty line (deﬁned by the social-
security beneﬁt for single-childless adults in both Belgium and Germany, about 500 Euros)
and we add increments of three poverty lines for each next income category (that deﬁnes
a level of well-being). Our selection of reference-income increments matches approximately
the bottom-, middle-, and top income-distribution quintile in both countries.3
3 Both Belgium and Germany had similar per-capita incomes and personal-income distributions at the time
of sampling. The social-security beneﬁt for an unemployed single childless adult was 523 Euros in Belgium
in 2002 (see the database “MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Member States
of the Eurpean Union)” provided by EUROSTAT). According to the Regulation of Compensation Rules
and to the 12th Book of the Social Welfare Code in Germany (Regelsatzverordnung (2004) and Sozialgeset-
7Our samples consist of 149 respondents in Belgium and 164 in Germany. The question-
naire appeared on the internet and was advertised through web newslette r si nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .
Each respondent got a participation compensation of 5 Euros. The Belgian sample was col-
lected in April 2002, whereas the German sample in February 2005. Table 1 presents a
breakdown of the sample statistics for both countries.
The gender distribution of Germany is biased towards having more male respondents.
In both countries, most respondents come from the age bracket of 20-40 years old and they
are highly educated. These biases might be explained by the structure of internet users.4
In a previous paper with similar welfare-evaluation questions (see Koulovatianos, Schröder
and Schmidt (2005)), we have found no compelling evidence that personal characteristics or
the survey medium (written vs. internet) bias the resulting estimates of equivalent incomes.
Therefore, possible sampling biases are not expected to be a burden in eliciting credible
information about the inter-household comparisons of well-being.5
3. Equivalent-income proﬁles
Table 2 gives a comprehensive summary of our results, by presenting the sample means of the
stated equivalent incomes. An immediate observation is that respondents always compensate
households for their loss in non-market time endowment or for their labor-market eﬀort. This
zbuch - SGBXII (2004)), the unemployment beneﬁt for a single childless adult was between 282-297 Euros
in Germany in 2004. According to the Law of Housing Beneﬁts (Wohngeldgesetz (2004) - paragraph 2)
compensations for housing vary according to personal and family characteristics. A plausible estimate for
single-adult housing in 2004 is 200 Euros. Therefore, the total 2004 beneﬁts in Germany were about 500
Euros. We interpret this total amount as the poverty line.
4 For example, according to the annual publication of the Elections Research Group in Germany for year
2004 (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2004)), most internet users are male (about 58%), highly educated and
people above the age 50 are under-represented.
5 See also section 4.2, p. 989 in Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005) for evidence that even the levels
of well-being of respondents do not inﬂuence signiﬁcantly their evaluations of income needs of hypothetical
households with welfare diﬀerent from this of the respondents. This ﬁnding also supports that the use of
a “small” sample of respondents is not a burden for estimating equivalent incomes. A “small” sample of
respondents that provide reliable information about many hypothetical households is able to generate a large
number of observations that is appropriate for statistical inference.
8is a plausible result, consistent with predictions by any documented theory of the value of
time, at least to our knowledge.
A set of comparisons and tests can reveal some sources of responsiveness of the stated time
compensations. Table 3 shows the change in equivalent incomes varying the time endowment
of hypothetical households by changing the employment statuso fo n ea d u l ti ne a c hc a s e .S o ,
the ﬁrst four columns of Table 3 state the diﬀerence in equivalent incomes in single-adult
households when the adult moves, exogenously, from the condition of being unemployed
to this of being employed. Moving from left to right, each column adds one child in the
household. The following group of four columns shows the compensations for households
with two adults of types UU and EU, i.e. when the number of employees in the household
raises from zero to one employee. Finally, the last four columns present compensations for
switching from household types with adults EU to EE, namely, the case of shifting from a
“traditional household” of one employee to a “non-traditional household” with both adults
employed.6
All welfare-preserving compensations appearing in Table 3 are statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences of the relevant averages stated in Table 2.7 All these numbers contain impor-
tant information about reservation wages or about determinants behind early-retirement
decisions. We remind that in both Belgium and Germany, the total monthly social-security
beneﬁt for unemployed single childless adults was about 500 Euros in the years we conducted
our survey, which is also interpreted as the German poverty line. Our lowest reference in-
6 We borrow the terms “traditional” and “non-traditional” household from Apps and Rees (2002). We do
not present the comparison of household types with two adults being EE and UU, as these do not add more
insights to the observations that we make below. Moreover, these comparisons can be obtained directly from
Table 3.
7 As each respondent provides subjective evaluations for all types of households and income levels, all values
are reported by the same group of individuals. Since these equivalent incomes are not independent, we
have performed pairwise t-tests of diﬀerence of means. All compensations stated in Table 3 (the numbers
outside the brackets), are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 99% conﬁdence level and these t-tests are
not reported in Table 3, but they can be provided by the authors upon request.
9come is also 500 Euros, so the average stated compensation for the single-childless adult for
the living standard at the poverty line implies that the monthly reservation wage in Belgium
is about 803 Euros. In Germany, with a similar logic, the reservation wage should be about
903 Euros.
With respect to early retirement decisions, our estimates in Table 3 can be closely linked
with threshold wage and pension diﬀerentials that drive certain labor groups from particular
family types out of the labor market. This subject, the threshold diﬀerential of wage-pension
income ﬂows for retirement decisions has received a lot of attention, especially in Europe, in
light of the trends in the skill premium since the beginning of the 1990’s. In particular, the
reported upwards trend in the skill premium and, in many cases the drop in the absolute
wage of the low-skill workers, has been considered to be the key explanation to an increase
in the early-retirement decisions trend in both Europe and in the US.8 Yet, it is diﬃcult
to obtain estimates of the threshold diﬀerential of wage-pension income ﬂows for retirement
decisions. So, our study may shed some light on this matter.
4. Using our survey to test hypotheses motivated by time-use
survey data
S e v e r a ls c h o l a r sh a v es t u d i e dt h er o l eo ft i m ei nh o m ep r o d u c t i o nb yc o m b i n i n gc o n s u m p t i o n
expenditure data with data from time-use surveys. Time-use questionnaires elicit the time
allocation of respondents among market and non-market activities.9 They reveal the nature
of non-market activities and also allow to understand the linkage of activity types with
observed demands for speciﬁc market goods.10 Gronau and Hamermesh (2001) present time-
8 For a comprehensive picture of early-retirement trends in Europe and the US, see Herbertsson and Orszag
(2003, Table 1, p. 2).
9 Time-use surveys ﬁrst appeared in Bloch (1973) and Gronau (1976), while a book summarizing recent
results on time use is Hamermesh and Pfann (2005).
10See, for example, Gronau and Hamermesh (2003) for a very comprehensive study in Israel and the US,
and especially Table 1 and the Appendix, where the authors suggest explicit connections between activities
10use data across six countries and provide several facts about time use and activity diversity
across educational levels.11 To the extent that such facts are consistent across countries, the
theory of home production choices is called for comprehensive explanations.
Time-use data add important features of home production activities that are unobserved
in consumer-expenditure and labor surveys. Yet, although time-use data enrich the dimen-
sions of information input in applied models, available information is still inadequate to
specify irrefutable assumptions that are necessary for modeling consumer, home-production,
and labor-supply choices. However, combined with our results, assumptions and models can
be double-checked. In this section we present tests revealing that our database is consistent
with several plausible assumptions made in the literature, or transparent from the descrip-
tive statistics of time-use surveys. Three of the working hypotheses that are stressed in
studies motivated by time-use surveys, are consistent with our results. In particular, our
results support that, (a) household setups that yield a Ricardian-trade specialization type
of equilibrium between the two adults are rather plausible, (b) childcare is an important
household activity with strong implications for inter-household comparisons of well-being,
and (c) richer households can substitute more easily home-produced goods with market ﬁnal
goods, and/or, their home production time and eﬀort must be more eﬃcient compared to
the poor. We explain each of these points in the subsections below.
4.1 Specialization in the household
The ‘neoclassical’ approach to multi-person household consumer/labor supply theory has
been based on the idea that even multi-person households have a single objective. There
has been a signiﬁcant and early literature departing from the ‘neoclassical’ approach and
and demanded market goods.
11Another recent study providing similar observations from three countries is Ichino and Galdeano (2005).
11studying the possibilities of bargaining or exchange of incomes for market goods and time
between adults in the household. One can distinguish two main strands of literature.
In the ﬁrst strand, originated by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981), and receiving a comprehensive theoretical treatment by Chiappori (1988) and Brown-
ing and Chiappori (1998), the Nash-bargaining aspect of collective-decision households has
been set. Specialization results from non-cooperative games between adults in the house-
hold. This strand of literature is thoroughly examined at a very general theoretical and
methodological level. Chiappori (1988) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) point out that
the assumption of eﬃciency of collective decisions guarantees that models giving parametric
structure to estimations based on goods quantities, work time, and price data, can be ra-
tionalized by the data, in the sense that revealed preferences are consistent with feasibility
of collective choices. A distinct feature of this literature is that it has not been extended to
include any household production.
The second strand of literature, parallely developed, extends the collective approach
to household production. It suggests a within-household Ricardian-trade type of home-
production model, where adults specialize in market and non-market production activities
according to comparative advantage. This literature was originated by Apps (1981, 1982),
Apps and Jones (1986) and continued in a number of applications by Apps and Rees (1988,
1996, 1997, 1999, 2002).I na l lt h e s ep a p e r s ,t h ew o r k i n gh y p o t h e s i si st h a tt h e r ec a nb eg a i n s
from trade of home-production inputs between the two adults. Apps (2002), surveys this
work, stating explicitly that a number of assumptions are needed in order that the model
speciﬁcation be tractable, especially for the sharing rules and the household production
functions. Apps (2002, p. 28-29) emphasizes that time-use survey data have expanded the
information of household production unobsevables (at least, they provide the input decisions
12and the range of home-production activities), and helped to test for the plausibility of some
assumptions. Yet, she states that a considerable set of assumptions, with a questionmark
on their testability, is still unavoidable. A main reason is that home-production outputs are
unobservable, or, at least, diﬃcult to measure. Is our database appropriate to help?
It is plausible to think that EU family types posses possibilities to trade activity types
and time within the household, so that they can beneﬁt from specialization. In other words,
the welfare-retaining compensations for switching exogenously from UU to EU should be
small, given that the unemployed adult can specialize in carrying out the biggest load of
home-production activities. On the contrary, such a specialization advantage will be lost
when switching from EU to EE, because of the extreme narrowing in the ability to produce
at home. Therefore, compensations for such a change in the employment status should be
high. Of course, the latter reasoning holds for switching from U to E types of households.
In Table 4, we present comparisons of time-loss compensations for cases where family
types switch to a setting where there can be specialization (from UU to EU) with compensa-
tions for cases where family types switch to settings where they cannot specialize (from EU
to EE and from U to E). If specialization is important, then compensations for switching to
a setting where there cannot be specialization, should be higher than in cases of switching
to settings where specialization is possible.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 4, we present diﬀerences of time-loss compensations for
childless adult households taken from Table 3. For example, in the ﬁrst column of Table
4, for the reference income of 2000 Euros for Belgium, the number 138.39 is the diﬀerence
between 609.80 from the entry of the column “nC =0 ”o ft h ec a t e g o r y“ E E - E U ”i nT a b l e3
for Belgium (yr = 2000), and 471.41, from the corresponding entry in the category “EU-UU”
of Table 3. Underneath each entry of Table 4, we provide, in brackets, the p-value of pairwise
13t-tests of diﬀerences of means.
All diﬀerences in the ﬁrst column of Table 4 are both positive and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, indicating that time loss compensations are higher when the specialization ability of the
household worsens (switching from from UU to EU retains the ability to specialize, but this
is not true when switching from EU to EE). On the contrary, the second column of Table 4,
compares time-loss compensations for switching to cases without an ability to specialize (i.e.
a comparison of the case of switching from U to E and EU to EE). Except from the highest
reference income for Germany, all these diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant, supporting that our
respondents take into account the eﬀects of specialization. Our conclusions are reconﬁrmed
by the comparisons of the third column of Table 4, (the comparison between switching from
Ut oEa n df r o mU Ut oE U ) .
Table 4 is restricted to examining childless households only. When children are present,
a d u l t sc a na l s os p e c i a l i z ew i t hr e s p e c tt oav e r yi m portant home activity, childcare. For this
reason, we present distinct observations and tests for families with children in the section
that focuses on childcare, right below.
4.2 The importance of childcare
In Gronau and Hamermesh (2003 - Tables 2a and 2b), it is transparent that time devoted
to childcare is an important part of the population-wide home-time allocation, in all six
countries they study. Similar, but even stronger, is the message from the more detailed
work on United States and Israel by Gronau and Hamermesh (2001) who link up types of
activities with activity-speciﬁc market-good expenditures. They come up with goods/time
intensities for each activity, in a similar fashion to observing realized capital/labor ratios
across production activities. Besides sleep, in both US and Israeli databases, childcare is
the second time-intensive activity after “leisure” (see Gronau and Hamermesh (2001 - Table
141 and their appendix)).12 Apps and Rees (2002) stress the importance of childcare based
on an Australian time use survey and provide an analysis for re-examining child costs after
including considerations about childcare time.
Is our survey able to provide information about the implications of childcare for inter-
household comparisons of well-being? Our respondents are not required to state any cost of
particular activities (such as childare), but to state the welfare-retaining aggregate incomes
for a range of family types, employment status and levels of well-being. But the generality
of our data is not a burden. If time devoted to childcare matters for the overall choices of a
household, then compensations for losses of non-market time endowments should depend on
the presence of children. In Table 3, the numbers appearing in brackets are the p-values of
pairwise t-tests of equality of means for testing whether these compensations are increasing
when additional children are present in the family. So, brackets under averages are the p-
v a l u ef o rt h ec o m p a r i s o no ft h eaverage above the p-value and the average in the entry next
to it on the left.
In Table 3 we can see that, in both countries, for all levels of well-being, time-loss
compensations increase in the presence of additional children, in cases where all adults work
full time (E versus U and EE versus EU). In connection with the previous subsection, the
absence of specialization possibilities in family types E and EE and the fact that childcare
is time-intensive, contribute to an increasing aggregate-budget compensation pattern due to
the need for childcare time.
In the case of inter-household comparisons between families with adults of type UU and
EU, time-loss compensations do not exhibit an increasing pattern in t h ep r e s e n c eo fm o r e
children. Specialization possibilities in EU allow the non-working partner to devote more
12Sleep is assumed to have inﬁnite time intensity in Gronau and Hemermesh (2003). For an extensive study
on the cross-country empirical facts and the economics of sleep see Biddle and Hamermesh (1990).
15time for childcare, and the household does not incur a higher loss in well-being due to the
presence of more children.
This test that we present in Table 3 advocates the importance of childcare. In the
cases where the time budget is suppressed to the maximum possible (all adults work in the
market), each additional child increases the opportunity cost of time at home. The result of
the analysis of time-use surveys by Gronau and Hamermesh (2003), that childcare is time-
intensive is a good match with our ﬁndings. At the same time, it might take about the
same time to take care of two children as it takes for one, i.e. childcare is subject to joint
production.
As the early analysis by Pollak and Wachter (1975) indicates, joint production drives
(observable) consumer demands for intermediate goods to be dependent on preferences over
unobservable ﬁnal home production goods. They provide some ideas for tackling this prob-
lem so that the estimation through a demand system becomes possible. So far, there are no
applied studies, at least to our knowledge, that deal empirically with the joint-production
aspect of childcare. Combined with our data, econometric or calibrated models can possibly
help to build this extension that seems to be crucial. In fact, using an applied model to
replicate our ﬁndings, could shed light on the popular hypothesis that parents may derive
non-negligible utility from time with their children.13 An important dimension of this ex-
tension is that childcare is both expensive to buy in the markets and also market childcare
may not be treated as a perfect substitute to childcare by parents.
13See, for example, the conclusions of Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003 - p. 223), who study time allocation
data in Finland.
164.3 Richer households suﬀer relatively less from non-market time-
endowment losses
Several facts are transparent about the time allocation of rich and poor (in particular,
t h el e s sa n dt h em o r ee d u c a t e d )f r o mt h ee x t e n sive work by Bloch (1973), Gronau (1976),
(1977), (1980) and (1997), and in the more detailed papers by Gronau and Hamermesh
(2001) and (2003). Speciﬁcally, households with more educated adults, (a) spend more time
f o rc h i l d c a r e ,( b )d e v o t el e s st i m ef o rh o m ep roduction, and, (c) their home-production
activities are more goods-intensive.
The last two empirical observations lead to the plausible hypothesis that the richer house-
holds are more able to substitute home-produced goods with market ﬁnal goods. Following
the example of cooking at home, poor unemployed single adults might dine less in restau-
rants than richer unemployed single adults. The need for a shift in the outsourcing decision
for food by the poorer might be higher than this by the richer, when their non-market time
endowment decreases. At the same time, the home production time and eﬀort of the rich
must be more eﬃcient compared to the poor, due to the fact that the richer may own a wider
range and better quality of home-production durables. The empirical fact that, historically,
the poorer have had less durable goods is supported by the ﬁndings of Day (1992, Table 8, p.
319), and it is a major result in the analysis of Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005).
If this hypothesis is correct, then non-market time-endowment losses are more easily borne
by the rich compared to the poor. The time-loss compensations must be a lower fraction of
the income of the rich compared to the corresponding fraction for the poor.
In order to compare the relative strength of this eﬀect of income on time-allocation
choices, we divide the proﬁles of equivalent incomes for each level of well-being by the corre-
sponding reference income of the unemployed single childless adult (the reference household).
17The ratio of the equivalent income of a household type by the reference income of the refer-
ence household gives its “equivalence scale.” The example above about dining in restaurants
and the empirical facts about the goods-intensity of home-production activities of the rich,
advocate that equivalence scales of poorer households with employed adults should be higher
compared to these of the richer.
In Table 5 we present the averages of equivalence scales in both countries. It is transparent
that equivalence scales fall with income. In our previous work (see Koulovatianos, Schröder
and Schmidt (2005)), we have found that richer households exhibit a higher ability to share
consumption goods. This ﬁnding is an indication that higher incomes lead households to
choose a bundle of consumables that contain a higher intra-household sharing ability on the
aggregate. The property that equivalence scales fall as the reference income increases can
be attributed to both (i) diﬀerent sharing abilities between rich and poor in multi-person
households, and, (ii) to a diﬀerent ability of rich to cope with time losses. For example, in
the case of childless adults who are employed, equivalence scales drop as the reference income
increases, revealing that the second eﬀect is also applicable. We test these two eﬀects in the
section that follows, where we utilize all available information in our database for estimating
child costs, while controlling for each eﬀect of demographics and time-endowment variation
across households.
5. Estimates of child costs relative to an adult
A key goal of scholars who are interested in assessing household well being is to evaluate
children costs relative to an adult. Child-cost estimates are crucial, for example, in the eval-
uation of reservation wages and labor participation, tax policies and social security towards
various family types, marriage markets, etc. In this section we provide a range of estimates
18for child costs from our data.
So far, our database has revealed that several important aspects aﬀect resource- and time
allocations in households. In particular, our analysis has supported that, (i) specialization
in home/market activities is present in two-adult households, (ii) childcare has a signiﬁcant
impact on the overall household level of well-being, and (iii) living standards aﬀect the time
allocation towards ‘outsourcing’ home-produced goods with market substitutes. In order to
come up with a sensible estimate of relative child costs, these three aspects of inter-household
comparisons should be controlled for.
We build on the logic of Banks and Johnson (1994), who suggest a formalization for
measuring household economies of scale. To capture the main idea, consider a case of




with nA being the number of adults in the household, θ c a nb es e e na sa“ c a t c h - a l l ”p a r a -
meter, controlling for economies of scale in both household consumption and production. It
w o u l db ee x p e c t e dt h a tθ takes values between 0 and 1. Of course, the lower the estimate
of parameter θ, the higher the economies of scale.
Including families with children, assessing the cost of children as a fraction of the costs of
an adult, after controlling for the sharing potential of household goods, should be captured
by parameter α in,
EquivalenceScale =( nA + α · nC)
θ ,
where nC is the number of children. In Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005) we
found that both parameters, θ and α, fall as the living standard, captured by the reference
income, increases.
19We extend this approach to including the costs of non-market time-endowment losses by
specifying a regression as follows,
ESi,y =

nA + αy · nC + βy · nE
θy
+ by · PERSONALi + ei,y .( 1 )
By ESi,y we denote respondent “i’s” stated equivalence scale corresponding to reference
income “y.”T h ev a r i a b l enA is the number of adults, nC is the number of children, and nE
is the number of employed adults in the household. So, nA, nE,a n dnC deﬁne the household
type. As in the Banks-Johnson (1994) speciﬁcation, parameter θy captures and controls for
economies of scale in household consumption and production at reference income y. Para-
meter βy is the time-endowment-loss compensation relative to the cost of an unemployed
adult, after controlling for household economies of scale, at a certain level of well-being. Pa-
rameter αy then gives the costs of children relative toa nu n e m p l o y e da d u l t ,a f t e rc o n t r o l l i n g
for household economies of scale and time-loss compensations at reference income y.
PERSONALi is a set of conditioning variables that comprise the personal characteristics
of respondent i, listed in Table 1. Finally, ei,y is the error term.
By running a separate regression for each reference income, y,w ec o n t r o lf o rt h ei m -
pact of the level of well-being on equivalence scales. This strategy controls for aspect (iii)
mentioned above, that living standards seem to aﬀect the sharing potential and time allo-
cation of households. In particular, if the impact of non-market time-endowment variations
on equivalence scales is lower for the rich than for the poor, then the estimator ˆ βy should
be lower as the reference income increases. The columns “Spec. 1” in Tables 6a and 6b
show that this is the case. Moreover, as in Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005), the
estimators ˆ αy and ˆ θy fall with reference income as well.14
14This property, that the rich exhibit a higher ability to share (the richer have a lower ˆ θy), has received
recent theoretical attention and empirical support. In particular, Donaldson and Pendakur (2004) suggest
20Yet, the speciﬁcation given by (1) does not disentangle the comparative impact of aspects
(i) and (ii) mentioned above, namely, the specialization hypothesis and the importance of
childcare in inter-household comparisons. For example, parameter βy might contain time-
loss compensations for time otherwise channel e dt oc h i l d c a r e .I nt h i sc a s e ,e s t i m a t e so fαy
based on (1) may bias child costs downwards. For this reason, we suggest three additional
alternative speciﬁcations that also serve as a sensitivity analysis for the estimators of αy
provided by speciﬁcation (1).
We introduce two dummy variables that allow to disentangle the impact of specialization
and childcare costs. First, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one whenever all
adults in the household are employed, denoted as “DF,” to capture the concept of full time-
endowment loss. So, DF distinguishes the single-employed-adult households (with children
or not) and the two-adult households with both adults working, from all other family types
that have more available time. As childcare is time-intensive, children costs should be higher
in these time-constrained family types. On the contrary, in two-adult households with only
one employed, it is possible that the unemployed adult undertakes childcare, saving part of
this cost for the household. To test this hypothesis, we introduce another dummy variable,
“DEU,” that takes the value one if the household type has two adults, one employed and
one unemployed (EU). Thus, in the regression,
ESi,y =

nA + αy · nC + βy · nE + γy · nC · DEU + δy · nC · DF
θy
+
+by · PERSONAL i + ei,y .( 2 )
the new parameter, δy, can capture the extra children costs borne by families with all adults
that demand systems characterized by a property they name “Generalized Equivalence Scale Exactness
(GESE)” outperform previous demand systems and provide evidence that equivalence scales fall with rising
income in Canada. Donaldson and Pendakur (2005) introduce a new property for demand systems, “Gen-
eralized Absolute Equivalence Scale Exactness (GAESE),” according to which scales can fall with income if
households face ﬁxed costs of family-type characteristics, and they provide new evidence from Canada that
this is, indeed, the case.
21being fully employed, and is expected to be positive and signiﬁcant, whereas parameter γy
is expected to be zero (insigniﬁcant). In Tables 6a and 6b, the results of the regression
speciﬁcation given by (2) are presented in columns “Spec. 2.” Indeed, γy is insigniﬁcant in
all cases, whereas δy is positive and signiﬁcant, with the sole exception of Belgium for the
highest reference income.
We modify the speciﬁcation given by (2), in order to control for specialization in home
activities other than childcare, using,
ESi,y =

nA + αy · nC + γy · nC · DEU + δy · nC · DF + ζy · nA · DEU + ηy · nA · DF
θy
+
+by · PERSONALi + ei,y . (3)
If there is signiﬁcant specialization in the household, this speciﬁcation given by (3) should
also imply that ζy is smaller than ηy, providing a diﬀerent set of controlling variables for
estimating child costs. Tables 6a and 6b show (columns “Spec. 3”) that this is the case.
Last, extending the sensitivity analysis, to distinguish among all household types, using
two extra dummies, “DE” corresponding to single-adult households where the adult is em-




nA + αy · nC + γy · nC · DEU + ζy · nA · DEU + ϕy · nC · DE + χy · nC · DEE+
+ψy · nA · DE + ωy · nA · DEE
θy
+ by · PERSONAL i + ei,y.( 4 )
Consistently with our previous ﬁndings about the specialization hypothesis, the estimates of
(4) in Tables 6a and 6b reveal that, generally, ζy is smaller than ψy and ωy. Again, children
a r em o r ec o s t l yi nh o u s e h o l d sw here all adults are employed.
22In Tables 6a and 6b all reported estimates are controlled for the respondents’ personal
characteristics. However, we do not report the estimates of the vector by. Although the
inclusion of personal characteristics adds some explanatory power to the regressions (it
increases ¯ R2), it does not alter the levels of the reported estimates. We found no personal
characteristic that is either robust or preserving its sign across all reference incomes for each
speciﬁcation.15
Tables 6a and 6b provide the opportunity to derive children costs from all coeﬃcients that
are linked with the presence of children in the household, and to have a direct assessment
of relative children costs from our survey. In Table 7 we present a summary of the ranges
of children costs that result from speciﬁcation 4, given that this controls for specialization
eﬀects, both with respect to childcare and with respect to all other home activities. In
particular, we present estimates for two-adult households, EU versus EE households, in
order to compare our results with these of Apps and Rees (2002). Two important ﬁndings
conveyed by Table 7, are that relative child costs fall as the reference income increases and
that relative child costs are higher in EE family types compared to EU.
To our knowledge, Apps and Rees (2002) is the only study that takes specialization in
home production activities and time for childcare seriously into account for estimating child
costs. We have argued that our respondents must capture these two aspects of household
economics, and all our results support that this direction of modeling is both plausible
and promising. In Table 7 we also state the Apps and Rees (2002) estimates. In Apps
and Rees (2002, see p. 645), the sum of childcare purchased goods, home production for
children and childcare time costs, sums to about 78% to 98% of the total consumption of
an adult male. These numbers are higher compared to ours. This diﬀerence must be due
to the particular assumptions on sharing rules and on the nature of the home-production
15The estimates of personal characteristics can be provided by the authors upon request.
23functions that Apps and Rees (2002) make in order to allow for a ‘smooth’ estimation process
through a demand system that also matches time-use data. The additional hypotheses of
joint production possibilities and scale economies with respect to childcare time, must be a
plausible direction to follow and a natural extension of the analysis of Apps and Rees (2002).
6. Suggested extensions
As we stressed in the introduction, our study was motivated by the fact that all theories of
home production decisions and labor supply have to rely upon strong assumptions in order to
deal with unobservables. Our analysis supports two hypotheses, this of specialization in home
production and of the importance of childcare-time costs as key determinants of household
well-being, as suggested by Apps and Rees (2002). Our estimates can provide a ‘roadmap’
of the equilibrium inter-household rankings of well-being due to consumer-expenditure and
time-allocation household choices. Demand systems, as this of Apps and Rees (2002) that
model childcare explicitly can be tested to ﬁt data obtained by surveys like ours.
B u tt h eu s eo fe c o n o m e t r i cd e m a n ds y s t e m si sn o tt h eo n l ya v a i l a b l ea p p r o a c hf o rt a c k l i n g
household economics and labor-supply behavior. There is a strand of studies that incorpo-
rate richer economics behind consumer behavior, stressing lifetime utility maximization and
permanent-income considerations in order to derive consumer choice can beneﬁt from our
data. Papers as this of Aiyagari, Greenwood and Güner (2000), Greenwood, Güner and
Knowles (2000) and Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005), look at marriage decisions,
social security or the long-run development of labor-supply (especially female-labor partic-
ipation). Such studies with dynamic households stress the savings plans of households as
well. Reduced-form econometric models are diﬃcult to derive from such simulated models,
and a calibration methodology is used instead. As we give reference monthly-income ﬂows
24to our respondents, our subjects may not rule out savings plans and life-cycle considerations.
Therefore, the model speciﬁcation of dynamic models can also be guided by ﬁtting our re-
sults. Finally, our evidence that richer households can cope more easily with non-market
time-endowment losses can initiate a new working hypothesis for future research.
7. Conclusion
We implemented a survey method for estimating the link between household well-being and
non-market time endowments across diﬀerent family types. Our database from two countries,
Belgium and Germany, enabled the testing of two important hypotheses in the literature,
that specialization in home production and childcare-time costs are important determinants
of household well-being. These have been the working hypotheses in Apps and Rees (2002),
and our study implies that they are both plausible. In addition, we ﬁnd that rich households
can deal more easily with decreases in non-market time endowments, possibly due to their
higher comparative ability to outsource home-produced goods with market substitutes. We
provided estimates of child costs relative to an adult as functions of household characteristics
at diﬀerent levels of well-being. These estimates suggest that relative child costs are higher
for households that are time-constrained (all adults in the household work), and also higher
for poorer households.
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28         Table 1     Personal characteristics of respondents 
  Belgium Germany 
  N=149 N=164 
  N % N % 
Gender      
Female            69  46.3  56  34.1 
Male              80  53.7  108  65.9 
Partner      
Yes               109  73.2  69  42.1 
No                40  26.8  95  57.9 
Children      
None              80  53.7  140  85.4 
One               17  11.4  18  11.0 
Two               31  20.8  5  3.0 
More than two     21  14.1  1  0.6 
Siblings      
None              1  0.7  30  18.3 
One               10  6.7  51  31.1 
Two               69  46.3  57  34.8 
More than two     69  46.3  26  15.8 
Age      
< 20 years        1  0.7  0  0.0 
20 - 40 years     108  72.5  147  89.6 
> 40 years        40  26.8  17  10.4 
Education              
Unfinished education       0  0.0  1  0.6 
Element. school     1  0.7  1  0.6 
Second. school       10  6.7  3  1.8 
Special German second. School  ---  ---  2  1.2 
German second. School  ---  ---  98  59.8 
Techn. school or university  138  92.6  59  36.0 
Occupational group            
Social-sec. rec. or unemployed      1 0.7  1 0.6 
Blue-collar worker         3  2.0  1  0.6 
White-collar worker         118  79.2  45  27.4 
Civil servant                 11  7.4  8  4.8 
Pupil. student. trainee        12  8.1  102  62.4 
Self-employed               2  1.3  5  3.0 
Pensioner                     2  1.3  1  0.6 
Housewife. houseman            0  0.0  1  0.6 
Own working time           
Not working                  3  2.0  27  16.5 
Working irregularly           6  4.0  63  38.4 
Working 1/2 day      3  2.0  25  15.2 
Working 1/1 day       137  91.9  49  29.9 
Working time of partner             
Not working                51  34.2  117  71.3 
Working irregularly         0  0.0  6  3.7 
Working 1/2 day    17  11.4  12  7.3 
Working 1/1 day     81  54.4  29  17.7 
After-tax household income      
y_p < 1.75P              4  2.7  64  39.0 
1.75P ≤ y_p < 3.25P     36  24.2  46  28.0 
3.25P ≤ y_p < 4.75P      28  18.8  24  14.6 
4.75P ≤ y_p < 6.25P       41  27.5  18  11.0 
y_p ≥ 6.25P                40  26.8  12  7.4 
P denotes social assistance for a single adult in Germany. 
          Table 2 – Average stated equivalent incomes (values in Euros) 
   Belgium    Germany 
yr n C  U  E  UU EU EE  U  E  UU EU EE 







































































































































































































































Average equivalent incomes. Standard deviations in parentheses. nC denotes the number of children; yr denotes the level of reference income; each U denotes an 
unemployed adult, each E denotes an employed adult. 
   E - U  EU - UU  EE - EU 
yr   nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 
Belgium 
303.32  331.48  357.58  381.44  261.14  259.06  263.66  255.81  309.66  372.18  400.44  429.06  500 
 [0.02]  [0.00]  [0.02]   [0.29]  [0.29]  [0.40]   [0.00]  [0.09]  [0.01] 
621.88  692.21  741.48  800.13  471.41  502.01  514.90  556.78  609.80  700.00  749.40  788.46  2000 
 [0.03]  [0.01]  [0.00]   [0.11]  [0.09]  [0.08]   [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
783.39  893.32  946.17  1021.58  708.22  707.99  696.24  722.55  864.66  983.52  1064.80  1129.16  3500 
 [0.00]  [0.02]  [0.01]   [0.46]  [0.41]  [0.35]   [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Germany  
403.35  425.76  428.26  435.64  338.41  340.91  347.44  360.27  400.30  463.57  501.37  537.96  500 
 [0.01]  [0.38]  [0.12]   [0.34]  [0.15]  [0.14]   [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
829.57  847.71  888.11  917.35  643.51  676.22  681.25  691.80  847.80  944.51  1019.45  1102.74  2000 
 [0.23]  [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.00]  [0.20]  [0.10]   [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
1040.70  1123.78  1165.73  1212.50  858.38  943.32  966.34  988.60  1296.49  1382.16  1451.34  1518.29  3500 
 [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.00]  [0.02]  [0.03]   [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Note. Income increments for employees; pairwise t test of means; p values in brackets. yr denotes the reference income; nC denotes the number of children. 
 









Table 4 – Tests for the specialization hypothesis 
 
yr  (EE-EU) - (EU-UU)  (E-U) - (EE-EU)  (E-U) - (EU-UU) 
 Belgium 


















 Germany   


















Notes. yr denotes the level of reference income. Pairwise two-tailed t-tests. p 
values appearing in parentheses. 
 
   Table 5 – Average equivalence scales 
 
   Belgium  Germany 
  nC  yr = 500  yr = 2000  yr = 3500  yr = 500  yr = 2000  yr = 3500 























(0.231)  U 
















































































































































































































Notes. Average equivalence scales. Standard deviations in parentheses. nC denotes the number of children.  
yr denotes the level of reference income. 
 Belgium
 
yr y r = 500  yr = 2000
  yr = 3500
 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4 



























βy  E n   0.91*** 
(0.05) 
0.75*** 
(0.06)     0.64*** 
(0.05) 
0.51*** 
(0.06)     0.57*** 
(0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.06)    
















δy  F C D n ⋅     0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04)     0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04)     0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05)   
ζy  EU A D n ⋅      0.30*** 
(0.04) 
0.32*** 
(0.05)     0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 




ηy  F A D n ⋅      0.74*** 
(0.06)      0.51*** 
(0.05)      0.48*** 
(0.06)   
φy  E C D n ⋅       0.10** 
(0.05)      0.10** 
(0.05)      0.07 
(0.06) 
χy  EE C D n ⋅       0.20** 
(0.09)      0.24** 
(0.11)      0.22* 
(0.12) 
ψy   E A D n ⋅       0.75*** 
(0.06)      0.48*** 
(0.07)      0.42*** 
(0.08) 
ωy  EE A D n ⋅       0.77*** 
(0.06)      0.51*** 




























R   0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Notes: Regressions for each reference income in Belgium. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales stated by respondents taking a childless 
unemployed single adult as the reference household. Number of observations: 2831. White’s heteroskedasticity correction for covariance matrix; 
standard errors in parentheses; 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; 
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; 
* denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level; all other coefficients are insignificant. 
 






yr y r = 500  yr = 2000
  yr = 3500
 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4 



























βy  E n   0.95*** 
(0.04) 
0.82*** 
(0.05)     0.77*** 
(0.05) 
0.66*** 
(0.06)     0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.59*** 
(0.05)    
















δy  F C D n ⋅     0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03)     0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.07* 
(0.04)     0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03)   
ζy  EU A D n ⋅      0.34*** 
(0.04) 
0.37*** 
(0.04)     0.24*** 
(0.04) 
0.27*** 




ηy  F A D n ⋅      0.81*** 
(0.05)      0.66*** 
(0.05)      0.58*** 
(0.05)   
φy  E C D n ⋅       0.09** 
(0.04)      0.07 
(0.05)      0.12*** 
(0.04) 
χy  EE C D n ⋅       0.18** 
(0.07)      0.20** 
(0.09)      0.30*** 
(0.11) 
ψy   E A D n ⋅       0.80*** 
(0.06)      0.62*** 
(0.07)      0.40*** 
(0.07) 
ωy  EE A D n ⋅       0.86*** 
(0.07)      0.70*** 




























R   0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Notes: Regressions for each reference income in Germany. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales stated by respondents taking a childless 
unemployed single adult as the reference household. Number of observations: 3116. White’s heteroskedasticity correction for covariance matrix; 
standard errors in parentheses; 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; 
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; 
* denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level; all other coefficients are insignificant. 
 




 Spec. 4 
Belgium Germany 
Apps & Rees (2002)  yr 
EU  EE  EU  EE  EU (average income)  EE (average income) 
poor (500)  0.59 0.79 0.58 0.76 
middle (2000)  0.36 0.60 0.30 0.50 









Notes. yr is the level of reference income. 
a denotes a model specification without considering domestic production and parental 
childcare. 
b denotes a model specification considering domestic production and parental childcare. 
 





1. Purpose of the survey 
In general, different household types may have different income needs in order to attain a given 
living standard. These needs (measured in income amounts) may depend on the number of 
adults and children living in the household. Furthermore, household needs may vary with 
respect to the occupational status of the adults (unemployed or full-time employed) since this, 
for example, might affect the time adults can spend for cooking or educating their children. 
Therefore, the following question arises:  
 
Given the income of a specific household type (reference household), what is the income for 
another household type (differing with respect to the number of children and/or adults and/or 
number of employees) that allows this household to reach an identical living standard as the 
reference household? 
 
Since there does not exist an objective correct answer, we would like to know your subjective 
attitude towards this question.  
 
 
2. Personal characteristics 
 
We would like to ask you to state several of your own personal characteristics. Please mark 
the correct answer categories. Your answers will be treated confidentially and only for the 
stated research purpose. 
 
1)  Please state your gender:                male 
female 
 
2)  Are you living together with a partner?          yes 
no 
  
2a) In the case that you answered question 2) with “yes:” 
 Is  your  partner    working       not  at  all 





3)  How many children are living in your household?      0 
1 
2 
3 or more 
 
4) What is your family after-tax income per month?                         below 1.75P 
           1.75P  –  3.25P 
           3.25P  –  4.75P 
                             4.75P – 6.25P 
           6.25P  and  above 
 
  










houseman or - wife? 
 
6)  A r e   y o u   w o r k i n g          n o t   a t   a l l  








7)  Please  state  your  education  level:     no  degree 
elementary school 
          s e c o n d a r y   s c h o o l  
          M i t t l e r e   R e i f e  
          German  secondary 
        Technical  school  or   
university 
 
8)  Please state the number of siblings you lived together in a household during 
your  childhood?         0 
           1  
           2  
           3   o r   m o r e  
 
9)  Please mark the correct age category you belong to:      below 20 years 
20 – 40 years 





3. Income evaluation 
In the tables below you shall evaluate three different situations. The situations differ by the pre-
specified monthly net income (including all social transfers) of an unemployed and childless 
single-adult household. Now consider, for each situation separately, that the size and 
composition of the households change according to the table.  
 
Below, we give you an example of such a table. Please take some time to familiarize yourself 


















0 children  Reference 
income 
      
1 child 
 
       
2 children 
 
       
3 children 
 
       
 
Within a given table, all household types should attain an identical living standard. You are 
asked to fill in the gaps putting the after-tax family income that you believe brings the 
households that differ with respect to the numbers of children, adults, and employees, to the 
same living standard as the one of the single-childless-unemployed-adult household.  
 
Please complete the following three tables. Assume for your assessment that adults are 
between 35 and 55 and children between 7 and 11 years old. 
 
(In the actual survey, three tables are provided, with the same structure as above, each for a 
different reference income for the single-childless-unemployed-adult household in increasing 
order). 
 Diskussionsbeiträge 
des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft  




2005/1   CORNEO,  Giacomo 
    Media Capture in a Democracy: the Role of Wealth Concentration 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
2005/2    KOULOVATIANOS, Christos / Carsten SCHRÖDER /  Ulrich SCHMIDT 
  Welfare-Dependent  Household  Economies of Scale: Further Evidence 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
2005/3   CORNEO,  Giacomo 
    Steuern die Steuern Unternehmensentscheidungen? 20 S. 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
   
2005/4   RIESE,  Hajo 
    Otmar Issing und die chinesische Frage – Zu seinem Ausflug in die Wechselkurspolitik 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
2005/5    BERGER, Helge / Volker NITSCH 
    Zooming Out: The Trade Effect of the EURO in Historical Perspective 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
2005/6    JOCHIMSEN, Beate / Robert NUSCHELER 
  The Political Economy of the German Länder Deficits 
  Volkswirtschaftliche  Reihe 
 
2005/7    BITZER, Jürgen / Monika KEREKES 
    Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer Technology Across Borders?  
    A Reexamination. 19 S. 
  Volkswirtschaftliche  Reihe 
 
2005/8    KONRAD, Kai A. 
    Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
2005/9   NITSCH,  Volker 
    Currency Union Entries and Trade 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
2005/10  HUGHES HALLETT, Andrew 
    Are Independent Central Banks as Tough as They Pretend? 
  Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
 